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THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY AND THE ELUSIVE 
DEFINITION OF INDIAN TITLE 
by 
Blake A. Watson∗ 
On April 15, 2011, the Lewis & Clark Law Review hosted its Spring 
Symposium, entitled “The Future of International Law in Indigenous 
Affairs: The Doctrine of Discovery, the United Nations, and the 
Organization of American States.” While the Symposium participants 
agree that the doctrine of discovery should be rejected, they disagree on the 
impact of the discovery doctrine on native land rights in the United 
States. This Article examines the differing views of Indian title. 
Specifically, it contrasts the “limited owner” view of Indian title, under 
which Indian tribes retained nearly all of their proprietary rights, subject 
only to the government’s exclusive right of preemption, with the “limited 
possessor” view of Indian title, under which Indian tribes lost ownership 
of their lands by virtue of European discovery. The Article concludes 
that, although the “limited owner” view of Indian title is preferable to 
Indian nations, the Supreme Court has nonetheless adopted the “limited 
possessor” view. The Article further concludes that there is little downside 
to acknowledging that the Supreme Court has adopted the harsher 
“limited possessor” conception of Indian title, and that by doing so, 
opponents of the doctrine of discovery may be better positioned to secure its 
repudiation. 
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V.  CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 1023 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 15, 2011, the Lewis & Clark Law Review hosted its Spring 
Symposium, entitled The Future of International Law in Indigenous 
Affairs: The Doctrine of Discovery, the United Nations, and the Organization of 
American States. The focus on the impact of international law on 
indigenous affairs is certainly timely. In 2007 the United Nations 
approved the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which 
includes the statement that indigenous peoples “have the right to the 
lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, 
occupied or otherwise used or acquired.”1 The General Assembly 
adopted the Declaration over the opposition of Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and the United States. All four countries, however, subsequently 
endorsed the UN document, with certain qualifications.2 The United 
States and Canada will revisit the issue of indigenous rights when the 
Organization of American States (OAS) finalizes its proposed American 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.3 
The historic doctrine of discovery is also a topical subject. The 
doctrine—which was developed by European nations to justify the 
process of colonization and dominion—provides “that newly arrived 
 
1 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 
61/295, art. 26, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007). 
2 See Blake A. Watson, The Impact of the American Doctrine of Discovery on Native Land 
Rights in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 507, 547–49 (2011) 
[hereinafter Watson, The Impact of the American Doctrine of Discovery]. In April 2009, 
Australia reversed its prior position and endorsed the Declaration. A year later, on 
April 19, 2010, New Zealand announced its qualified support. Several months 
thereafter, on November 12, 2010, the Canadian government gave its qualified 
endorsement. Finally, on December 16, 2010, President Obama announced that the 
United States “is lending its support” to the Declaration. Id. at 549. 
3 See Working Group to Prepare the Draft American Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, Record of the Current Status of the Draft American Declaration, 
PERM. COUNCIL OF THE OAS: COMM. ON JUD. & POL. AFF. (Sept. 24, 2011), 
http://www.oas.org/consejo/cajp/Indigenous%20documents.asp#Record. As 
reported by the Indian Law Resource Center, “[i]ndigenous leaders from 25 
countries met in Washington D.C. in January 2011 seeking consensus on a proposed 
legal framework to protect economic, cultural and political rights of indigenous 
peoples of the Americas.” OAS: Indigenous Leaders Work to Protect Economic, 
Cultural, and Political Rights, INDIAN L. RESOURCE CTR., http://www.indianlaw.org 
/content/oas-headline. See also Gale Courey Toensing, Draft American Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Moves Forward, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Jan. 9, 
2009, available at http://www.indianlaw.org/sites/default/files/resources 
/Draft%20American%20Declaration%20on%20the%20Rights%20of%20Indigenous
%20Peoples%20moves%20forward.pdf. (“The American Declaration will 
complement the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Whereas the 
U.N. Declaration makes a universal and broad statement of rights, the American 
Declaration will address the particular needs of the indigenous peoples of the 
Americas.”). 
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Europeans immediately and automatically acquired legally recognized 
property rights in native lands and also gained governmental, political, 
and commercial rights over the inhabitants without the knowledge or the 
consent of the Indigenous peoples.”4 The discovery doctrine remains a 
foundational legal principle in the United States, New Zealand, Australia, 
Canada, and elsewhere. However, in recent years indigenous peoples, 
legal scholars, religious institutions, and nongovernmental organizations 
have called for its repudiation.5 In April of 2010, Special Rapporteur 
Tonya Gonnella Frichner, a member of the United Nations Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues, concluded her “preliminary study of the 
impact on indigenous peoples of the international legal construct known 
as the Doctrine of Discovery.”6 Frichner contends that the discovery 
doctrine “has been institutionalized in law and policy, on national and 
international levels, and lies at the root of the violations of indigenous 
peoples’ human rights, both individual and collective.”7 In recognition of 
the importance of this issue, the theme of the 11th Session of the United 
Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples, which will convene in 
2012, is “The Doctrine of Discovery: its enduring impact on indigenous 
peoples and the right to redress for past conquests.”8 
In 1974, Vine Deloria, Jr., inaugurated the modern era of 
scholarship on native land rights by including a critique of the doctrine 
of discovery in his book, Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An Indian 
Declaration of Independence.9 Since that time, numerous articles and books 
have examined the legal, economic, religious, and racial underpinnings 
of the discovery doctrine. In fact, the participants in the 2011 Spring 
Symposium have written five books and several articles about the 
 
4 ROBERT J. MILLER ET AL., DISCOVERING INDIGENOUS LANDS: THE DOCTRINE OF 
DISCOVERY IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES 2 (2010). 
5 The Episcopal Church of the United States and the Anglican Church of 
Canada have both renounced the doctrine of discovery “as fundamentally opposed to 
the Gospel of Jesus Christ and our understanding of the inherent rights that 
individuals and peoples have received from God.” Episcopal Church Repudiates Doctrine 
of Discovery, Calls on US to Do Same, THE PROGRESSIVE CHRISTIAN GUIDE TO PUB. POL’Y 
(July 29, 2009), http://weiwentg.blogspot.com/2009/07/episcopal-church-
repudiates-doctrine-of.html; Marites N. Sison, Reality Check: Landmark  
Resolution Renounces Doctrine of Discovery, ANGLICAN JOURNAL, June 9, 2010, 
http://www.anglicanjournal.com/nc/news-update-items/article/reality-check-
9220.html. 
6 Special Rapporteur, Preliminary Study of the Impact on Indigenous Peoples of 
the International Legal Construct Known as the Doctrine of Discovery, U.N. Econ. & 
Soc. Council, U.N. Doc. E/C.19/2010/13 (Feb. 4, 2010) (by Tonya Gonnella 
Frichner). See also Tonya Gonnella Frichner, The “Preliminary Study” on the Doctrine of 
Discovery, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 339, 339–40 (2010). 
7 Special Rapporteur, supra note 6. 
8 Press Release, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Permanent Indigenous Forum 
Discusses Provisional Agenda for 2011 Session, Including Proposed Special Theme 
‘The Doctrine of Discovery,’ U.N. Press Release HR/5063 (May 26, 2011). 
9 VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 85–111 (1974). 
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doctrine of discovery.10 The symposium participants all agree that the 
doctrine of discovery should be rejected. It is evident, however, that the 
symposium participants do not share identical views regarding the impact 
of the discovery doctrine on native land rights in the United States.11 The 
purpose of this Article is to examine the differing views of Indian title.  
In my own scholarship, I have suggested that the rights of ownership, 
possession, and disposition in native lands can be aggregated or diffused, 
leading to four different conceptions of indigenous land rights: 
(1)The indigenous inhabitants own the lands they occupy and 
also hold the right of possession. In addition, the indigenous 
inhabitants are free to sell or transfer their property rights to 
whomsoever they please. Preexisting indigenous property 
rights were unaffected by European “discovery.” 
(2)The indigenous inhabitants continue to own the lands they 
occupy but, after discovery, cannot sell their lands to 
whomsoever they please. The discoverer holds a “right of 
preemption,” giving the discoverer the exclusive right to 
acquire the property rights of the indigenous inhabitants. 
(3)The indigenous inhabitants continue to possess the lands they 
occupy but, after discovery, no longer own the lands they 
occupy. The discoverer owns the land subject to the native 
title, i.e., the right of possession (or occupancy). The 
 
10 See INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER, NATIVE LAND LAW PROJECT: DRAFT GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES OF LAW RELATING TO NATIVE LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES (Robert T. 
Coulter gen. ed., lawyers ed. 2010) [hereinafter DRAFT GENERAL PRINCIPLES]; ROBERT 
J. MILLER ET AL., supra note 4; ROBERT J. MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, DISCOVERED AND 
CONQUERED: THOMAS JEFFERSON, LEWIS & CLARK, AND MANIFEST DESTINY (2006); STEVEN 
T. NEWCOMB, PAGANS IN THE PROMISED LAND: DECODING THE DOCTRINE OF CHRISTIAN 
DISCOVERY (2008); LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF 
AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS (2005); BLAKE A. WATSON, 
BUYING AMERICA FROM THE INDIANS: JOHNSON V. MCINTOSH AND A HISTORY OF NATIVE 
LAND RIGHTS (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter WATSON, BUYING AMERICA FROM THE 
INDIANS]; Michael C. Blumm, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine: Aboriginal Title, Tribal 
Sovereignty, and Their Significance to Treaty-Making and Modern Natural Resources Policy in 
Indian Country, 28 VT. L. REV. 713 (2004); Robert J. Miller & Jacinta Ruru, An 
Indigenous Lens into Comparative Law: The Doctrine of Discovery in the United States and 
New Zealand, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 849 (2009); Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery in 
American Indian Law, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2005); Steven T. Newcomb, The Evidence of 
Christian Nationalism in Federal Indian Law: The Doctrine of Discovery, Johnson v. 
McIntosh, and Plenary Power, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 303 (1993); Lindsay G. 
Robertson, John Marshall as Colonial Historian: Reconsidering the Origins of the Discovery 
Doctrine, 13 J.L. & POL. 759 (1997); Blake A. Watson, John Marshall and Indian Land 
Rights: A Historical Rejoinder to the Claim of “Universal Recognition” of the Doctrine of 
Discovery, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 481 (2006); Watson, The Impact of the American 
Doctrine of Discovery, supra note 2. Lindsay Robertson was unable to attend the 
symposium. 
11 Although the symposium focused on the impact of the doctrine of discovery 
on indigenous rights in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States, this 
Article focuses only on the American discovery doctrine and the nature of Indian (or 
aboriginal) title in the United States. 
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discoverer/owner can transfer ownership notwithstanding 
the native title. The discoverer/owner has the exclusive 
(preemptive) right to extinguish the native title. Once the 
native title is extinguished, the discoverer/owner of the 
lands also has the right of possession. 
(4)The indigenous inhabitants have no property rights. The 
discoverer owns the land and holds the possessory rights. 
The indigenous inhabitants are trespassers (or perhaps 
“tenants at will”). When the discoverer/owner makes 
payments to the indigenous inhabitants it does so to 
expedite their removal, not to acquire property rights.12 
In the United States, the most favorable and least favorable conceptions 
of Indian title have been rejected.13 The Supreme Court, however, has 
subscribed at different times to the two intermediate definitions of 
Indian title. In Johnson v. McIntosh, an 1823 decision authored by Chief 
Justice John Marshall, the Court adopted a “limited possessor” notion of 
native land rights, proclaiming that European discovery of America “gave 
exclusive title to those who made it,” and that such discovery “necessarily 
diminished” the power of Indian nations “to dispose of the soil at their 
own will, to whomsoever they pleased.”14 Nine years later, however, the 
Court in Worcester v. Georgia endorsed the “limited owner” view of Indian 
title. Chief Justice Marshall again spoke for the Court, but now held that 
the discovery doctrine was a European agreement that “gave to the 
nation making the discovery . . . the sole right of acquiring the soil,” but 
did not “annul the previous rights of those who had not agreed to it.”15 
According to Johnson, the Indian tribes retained possession of their lands 
after discovery, but no longer owned the land and no longer held 
unlimited disposition rights. According to Worcester, the Indian tribes 
retained ownership and possession of their lands after discovery, but no 
longer held unlimited disposition rights. 
Michael Blumm and Robert “Tim” Coulter are proponents of what I 
have (inelegantly) called the “limited owner” view of Indian title set forth 
in Worcester. Professor Blumm argues that the discovery doctrine “left 
Indian tribes with nearly all of their proprietary rights,” and has 
described Indian title as a “fee simple subject to the government’s right 
 
12 Watson, The Impact of the American Doctrine of Discovery, supra note 2, at 516–17. 
13 The United States Supreme Court has never stated that native rights were 
“unaffected” by discovery. On the other hand, the Supreme Court never adopted the 
terra nullius doctrine, which holds that indigenous peoples have no property rights. In 
contrast, the British Crown relied on the terra nullius doctrine to claim absolute 
ownership of Australia. However, in Mabo v Queensland, the High Court of Australia 
finally acknowledged that “[t]he lands of this continent were not terra nullius” and 
held instead that “the common law of this country recognizes a form of native title.” 
Mabo v Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 15, 109 (Austl.). 
14 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). 
15 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 544 (1832). 
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of preemption,” or a “fee simple with a partial restraint on alienation.”16 
Tim Coulter, the executive director of the Indian Law Resource Center, 
likewise contends that the discovery doctrine did not diminish the 
ownership rights of the tribal nations, but rather only gave the United 
States “the pre-emptive right to purchase.”17 In other words, Blumm and 
Coulter argue that Indian tribes retained ownership and possession 
rights following discovery, and only suffered a limitation on their right of 
disposition (by virtue of the discovering nation’s self-proclaimed right of 
preemption). 
Lindsay Robertson, on the other hand, subscribes to the “limited 
possessor” conception of Indian title, stating that Indian tribes in 
America “lost ownership of their lands by virtue of discovery.”18 Based on 
the Supreme Court cases decided after Worcester v. Georgia, I agree with 
Professor Robertson. Although I would prefer that the Supreme Court 
adopt the “limited owner” view of Indian title, I believe the Court has 
instead opted for the “limited possessor” definition.  
In Part II of this Article, I describe the different views of Indian title 
(and Discoverer’s title) set forth by the Supreme Court, starting with 
Fletcher v. Peck19 and ending with City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation.20 
Although the effect of the discovery doctrine has been addressed in 
numerous Supreme Court decisions, I will focus on four cases: Fletcher, 
Johnson, Worcester, and Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States.21 
 
16 Blumm, supra note 10, at 718, 741 & n.183. 
17 DRAFT GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 14 (“Our general conclusion . . . is 
that there is no sound legal authority either in international or domestic law that the 
‘doctrine of discovery’ as a matter of law diminished the ownership rights of the Native 
owners or that it gave to the United States, as successor to the ‘discovering’ nations, 
any actual ownership interest in Indian lands apart from the preemptive right to 
purchase.”). 
18 ROBERTSON, supra note 10, at 144. See also id. at 99 (“Preemption historically 
had meant no more than the exclusive right to engage in a particular purchase 
transaction. The preemption right had not carried with it title to the land to which 
the right was claimed. Marshall’s language [in Johnson] ‘that discovery gave title to the 
government by whose subjects . . . it was made, . . . which title might be consummated 
by possession,’ thus worked a significant, if subtle, expansion . . . .”). 
 Two other symposium participants, Robert Miller and Tracey Lindberg, have 
stated that the discovery doctrine gave the discovering nation an “ownership right” 
that was “limited by the natives’ right to continue to occupy and use their land, which 
ostensibly could last forever.” MILLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 3. Miller, Lindberg and 
their co-authors, however, equate the “European title” with “the power of 
preemption,” and conclude that “[d]iscovery granted to the discovering European 
country the right of preemption.” Id. at 5. Although there is some caselaw to support 
this view, see infra notes 50–57, 106, and accompanying text, I believe the better view is 
that the discovery doctrine granted title and the right of preemption, to wit, the 
exclusive right to purchase or otherwise extinguish the remaining native right of 
occupancy. 
19 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
20 544 U.S. 197 (2005). 
21 348 U.S. 272 (1955). 
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In Part III of the Article, I respond to the argument that Indian title 
is more than a limited occupancy right. Aboriginal Indian title—as 
conceived by the Supreme Court—cannot be equated to a fee simple 
subject to a partial restraint on alienation, as suggested by Michael 
Blumm, because it may be terminated by the United States “without any 
legally enforceable obligation to compensate the Indians.”22 While I 
support the Draft General Principles of Law set forth by Tim Coulter and 
the Indian Law Resource Center, I unfortunately cannot agree that the 
Principles “state what the federal law really is concerning Native lands” as 
opposed to what “the federal law ought to be.”23 
In Part IV of the Article, I address whether Indian title can be 
analogized to common law property rights. The Supreme Court, lower 
courts, jurists, scholars, and others have compared Indian title to the 
following property rights: tenancy at sufferance, tenancy at will, license, 
usufructuary right, leasehold interest, term for years, life estate, fee 
simple subject to an executory limitation, fee simple subject to a partial 
restraint on alienation, fee simple subject to the right of preemption, full 
beneficial ownership, and absolute proprietorship (fee simple absolute). 
Likewise, the discoverer’s title has been variously characterized as a mere 
possibility of ownership, an expectancy, an exclusive option, a right of 
first refusal, a right of preemption, a reversion, a contingent remainder, a 
vested remainder, an executory interest, a “naked fee,” seisin in fee, and 
fee simple absolute. Given the unique nature (and illegitimate basis) of 
Indian title, all analogies ultimately fail. 
The authors of the most recent Cohen’s Handbook on Federal Indian 
Law believe that “the Tee-Hit-Ton rule has little relevance in modern 
Indian law.”24 Does it make any difference that the Supreme Court has 
rejected the preferable view of Indian title set forth in Worcester and 
adopted the “limited possessor” version set forth in Johnson and Tee-Hit-
Ton? In Part V of the Article, I argue that, because “Indians have rights of 
occupancy to their lands as sacred as the fee-simple,”25 there is little 
downside to acknowledging that it is nevertheless the law of the United 
States that Indian nations do not own their lands in fee simple. On the 
other hand, by pointing out that the Supreme Court has endorsed this 
more extreme version of the discovery doctrine, opponents of the 
doctrine may be better positioned to secure its repudiation. The “limited 
possessor” version of Indian title is particularly difficult to justify in view 
of contemporary norms of international indigenous rights and should be 
rejected along with the fallacious doctrine of discovery. 
 
22 Id. at 279. 
23 DRAFT GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 5. 
24 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 15.09[1][d], at 1025 (Nell Jessup 
Newton et al. eds., 2005). 
25 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 48 (1831). 
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II. INDIAN TITLE FROM FLETCHER TO SHERRILL 
A. Fletcher v. Peck (1810) 
Fletcher v. Peck is best known as the first instance in which a state law 
was struck down by the Supreme Court as contrary to the Constitution. 
Land speculators had arranged the “feigned case” to obtain a ruling on 
the constitutionality of the 1796 Georgia rescinding act, which was 
enacted to nullify the infamous 1795 “Yazoo” land sales authorized by 
corrupt legislators. The Court adopted an expansive interpretation of the 
Contract Clause and held that Georgia could not pass legislation that 
impaired the vested property rights of the Yazoo purchasers and their 
transferees.26 
Fletcher is notable for another reason: the majority and dissenting 
opinions set forth vastly different definitions of Indian title. The dispute 
required the Court to determine who owned the Yazoo lands: the state of 
Georgia (pursuant to its charter), the United States (pursuant to the 
“devolution of sovereignty” doctrine),27 or the southern tribes (by virtue 
of prior and continued occupancy). Both parties argued that the Indian 
tribes did not hold a proprietary fee simple title to the lands they 
occupied. Luther Martin, on behalf of Fletcher, argued that the Yazoo 
lands “belonged to the crown of Great Britain, and at the revolution 
devolved upon the United States, and not upon the state of Georgia.”28 
After asserting that the title was in the Crown, and then the United 
States, Martin equated the title with “a right of pre-emption”: “The title 
of the lands was in the crown. . . . It was only a right of pre-emption which 
the crown had. . . . There was only a possibility that the United States 
would purchase for the benefit of Georgia. But a mere possibility cannot 
be sold or granted.”29 Robert Goodloe Harper and (future Supreme 
Court Justice) Joseph Story represented Peck, and argued that Georgia 
 
26 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 10, cl. 1 (Contract Clause); Lindsay G. Robertson, “A Mere Feigned Case”: Rethinking 
the Fletcher v. Peck Conspiracy and Early Republican Legal Culture, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 
249, 252–55 (2000). 
27 Proponents of the “devolution of sovereignty” doctrine contended that, as a 
result of independence, title to trans-Appalachian lands passed directly from the 
British Crown to the national government. For example, in his 1780 pamphlet 
entitled Public Good, Thomas Paine argued that the boundaries of Virginia were 
reduced by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and title to the western lands upon 
independence was transferred to the United States “for the benefit of all.” 8 THOMAS 
PAINE, Public Good, in LIFE AND WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 120, 152 (Daniel Edwin 
Wheeler ed., 1908). 
28 Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 115. Luther Martin served nearly three decades 
as Attorney General of Maryland, and argued for the state in McCulloch v. Maryland. 
He participated in the 1805 impeachment trial of Supreme Court Justice Samuel 
Chase and Aaron Burr’s 1807 trial for treason. See BILL KAUFFMAN, FORGOTTEN 
FOUNDER, DRUNKEN PROPHET: THE LIFE OF LUTHER MARTIN 117, 140–41, 150–51, 159 
(2008). 
29 Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 124. 
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held title to the Yazoo lands, and that its concomitant power to transfer 
title “extends to lands to which the Indian title has not been 
extinguished”: 
What is the Indian title? It is a mere occupancy for the purpose of 
hunting. It is not like our tenures; they have no idea of a title to the 
soil itself. It is overrun by them, rather than inhabited. It is not a 
true and legal possession. It is a right not to be transferred but 
extinguished.30 
The question was raised during oral argument “whether the right which 
Georgia had before the extinguishment of the Indian title, is such a right 
as is susceptible of conveyance, and whether it can be said to be a title in 
fee-simple?”31 In response, Harper and Story denied that the Indian 
tribes owned the lands they inhabited: 
They had no idea of property in the soil but a right of occupation. 
. . . The crown of Great Britain granted lands to individuals, even 
while the Indian claim existed, and there has never been a question 
respecting the validity of such grants. When that claim was 
extinguished, the grantee was always admitted to have acquired a 
complete title. The Indian title is a mere privilege which does not 
affect the allodial right.32 
The Supreme Court in Fletcher determined that Georgia held title to the 
Yazoo lands. In the concluding sentences of his decision, Chief Justice 
Marshall stated that the “majority of the court is of opinion that the 
nature of the Indian title, which is certainly to be respected by all courts, 
until it be legitimately extinguished, is not such as to be absolutely 
repugnant to seisin in fee on the part of the state.”33 The nature of Indian 
title was not further defined. However, by declaring that Georgia held 
“seisin in fee,” Marshall concluded that the state held an ownership 
interest in the Yazoo lands that could be transferred even while the native 
occupants remained in possession.34 
 
30 Id. at 121 (citations omitted). Robert Goodloe Harper appeared in more 
Supreme Court cases than any other lawyer between 1800 and 1815, and in 1823 
would represent the private purchasers (along with Daniel Webster) in Johnson v. 
M’Intosh. See 3 G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–35, at 289 (1988). 
31 Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 122. 
32 Id. at 122–23. 
33 Id. at 142–43. 
34 See Blumm, supra note 10, at 774 (“Had the Chief Justice not embraced a dual 
tenurial system in Fletcher v. Peck—which made Indian title a kind of sui generis 
property right that could be interpreted by other courts unrestrained by Anglo-
American property rules—the Indians’ property interest would have been described 
as a fee simple subject to a right of preemption of the government because, 
functionally, that is what it was.”); and Howard R. Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal 
Rights in the Early Legal History of the United States, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 637, 641 (1978) 
(“[T]he use of the concept of fee simple to express a right of preemption set forth an 
idiom of discourse that would later serve, of itself, as a serious qualification of 
aboriginal land rights.”). New York Chancellor James Kent, in the 1832 edition of his 
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Justice William Johnson dissented, stating that Georgia had “nothing 
more than a power to acquire a fee-simple by purchase, when the 
proprietors should be pleased to sell,” and thus “had not a fee-simple in the 
lands in question.”35 The South Carolina jurist claimed that the southern 
tribes retained “the absolute proprietorship of their soil,” and reasoned 
that, “if the Indian nations be the absolute proprietors of their soil, no 
other nation can be said to have the same interest in it.”36 Georgia held 
“nothing more than . . . a right of conquest or of purchase, exclusively of 
all competitors within certain defined limits.”37 Although Luther Martin 
equated the “right of pre-emption” with “title,” Johnson pointed out the 
fallacy of this argument: 
It is awkward to apply the technical idea of a fee-simple to the 
interests of a nation, but I must consider an absolute right of soil as 
an estate to them and their heirs. A fee-simple estate may be held in 
reversion, but our law will not admit the idea of its being limited 
after a fee-simple. . . . If the interest in Georgia was nothing more than a 
pre-emptive right, how could that be called a fee-simple, which was nothing 
more than a power to acquire a fee-simple by purchase, when the proprietors 
should be pleased to sell?38 
Milner Ball claims that Justice Johnson’s dissent “argued for absolute 
tribal property rights.”39 Although Johnson refers to “absolute 
proprietorship” and “an absolute right of soil,” he also acknowledges that 
the native right of disposition is constrained by the European right of 
preemption. It follows, therefore, that Justice Johnson actually subscribed 
to the “limited owner” view of Indian title. 
B. Johnson v. McIntosh (1823) 
In Johnson and Graham’s Lessee v. McIntosh, the Supreme Court 
addressed whether an Indian tribe could sell its lands to private 
individuals. In the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, the dispute 
concerned “the power of Indians to give, and of private individuals to 
 
influential Commentaries on American Law, observed that Marshall’s characterization of 
Indian land rights in Fletcher was “a mere naked declaration, without any discussion or 
reasoning by the court in support of it.” 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN 
LAW 378 n.d (2d ed. 1832). 
35 Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 146–47 (first emphasis added). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 147. 
38 Id. (emphasis added). Thomas Jefferson, in notes written while serving as 
Secretary of State under President Washington, described his understanding of “our 
right in the Indian soil” in a similar fashion: “[a] right of preemption of their lands; 
that is to say, the sole and exclusive right of purchasing from them whenever they 
should be willing to sell.” Thomas Jefferson, Notes of a Conversation with George 
Hammond, June 3, 1792, in 17 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 322, 328 (Andrew 
A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., libr. ed. 1903). 
39 Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 38 
n.171 (1987). 
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receive, a title which can be sustained in the Courts of this country.”40 
The lawyers for William McIntosh argued that Indians “acquired no 
proprietary interest in the vast tracts of territory which they wandered 
over” and that the “Indian title” recognized in Fletcher was “a mere right 
of usufruct and habitation.”41 The Court agreed, and held that putative 
purchasers “do not exhibit a title which can be sustained in the Courts of 
the United States.”42 In support of this conclusion, Marshall invoked the 
doctrine of discovery and announced that “discovery gave title to the 
government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, 
against all other European governments, which title might be 
consummated by possession.”43 
Discovery conferred not one, but two rights on the discovering 
nation. In addition to title, the discoverer also acquired “the sole right of 
acquiring the soil from the natives, and establishing settlements upon 
it.”44 As a direct consequence, the rights of the native inhabitants were 
“necessarily diminished”: 
They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a 
legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it 
according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete 
sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, 
and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to 
whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental 
principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.45 
Marshall makes clear in Johnson what is implicit in Fletcher: that the 
discovering nation holds “a clear title to all the lands within the boundary 
lines described in the treaty, subject only to the Indian right of 
occupancy, and that the exclusive power to extinguish that right, was 
vested in that government which might constitutionally exercise it.”46 The 
discoverer’s “absolute ultimate title” is “subject only to the Indian title of 
occupancy, which title the discoverers possessed the exclusive right of 
 
40 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572 (1823). 
41 Id. at 569–70. 
42 Id. at 604–05. 
43 Id. at 573 (emphasis added). 
44 Id. James Kent understood that discovery conferred both title and the 
exclusive right to extinguish the remaining native right of occupancy. See 1 JAMES 
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 242 (1st ed. 1826) (“[T]he United States own 
the soil as well as the jurisdiction[] of the immense tracts of . . . unpatented lands, 
included within their territories[,] . . . and the Indians have only a right of 
occupancy, and the United States possess the legal title subject to that occupancy, and 
with an absolute and exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy either 
by conquest or purchase.” (emphasis added)). See also MILLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 
55 (acknowledging that Johnson held that the discoverer had both “clear title” and 
“the exclusive power to extinguish” the Indian right of occupancy). 
45 Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574. 
46 Id. at 585. For a more detailed description of the Johnson decision, see WATSON, 
BUYING AMERICA FROM THE INDIANS, supra note 10, at ch. 15. 
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acquiring.”47 The native occupancy right is “no more incompatible with a 
seisin in fee, than a lease for years, and might as effectually bar an 
ejectment.”48 Nevertheless, “the Indian inhabitants are to be considered 
merely as occupants, to be protected, indeed, while in peace, in the 
possession of their lands, but to be deemed incapable of transferring the 
absolute title to others.”49 
C. Worcester v. Georgia (1832) 
In Worcester v. Georgia, John Marshall rejected his prior view that 
“discovery gave title,” and announced instead that discovery only 
conferred a right of pre-emption, that is, the right of purchasing lands 
that the natives were willing to sell.50 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court 
did not expressly overrule Johnson, and soon thereafter state and federal 
courts returned to the “limited possessor” conception of Indian land 
rights. The “limited owner” conception of native land rights—first 
propounded by Justice Johnson in Fletcher and now accepted by Justice 
Marshall in Worcester—would give way after Marshall’s death in 1835 to 
the “limited possessor” view set forth in Johnson. 
Marshall denigrates the discovery doctrine in Worcester, but refuses to 
repudiate it.51 However, rather than grant both title and the right of 
preemption, Marshall suggests that discovery simply conferred the right 
to acquire the native rights of property: 
This principle . . . gave to the nation making the discovery . . . the 
sole right of acquiring the soil and of making settlements on it. . . . 
It regulated the right given by discovery among the European 
discoverers; but could not affect the rights of those already in 
possession . . . . It gave the exclusive right to purchase, but did not found 
that right on a denial of the right of the possessor to sell.52 
 
47 Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 592. 
48 Id. A possessory leasehold is not incompatible with seisin in fee: the lease 
grants the tenant a present right of possession, and the landlord retains his 
ownership of the fee simple (now held as a reversion), which he can transfer or 
protect in a lawsuit claiming waste. Ejectment is the common law cause of action to 
recover the possession of land. The holder of a right of possession—such as the 
Indian title of occupancy or a common law term for years—would thus prevail in an 
ejectment lawsuit. 
49 Id. at 591 (emphasis added). 
50 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543–44 (1832). 
51 Id. at 543 (“It is difficult to comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants 
of either quarter of the globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over 
the inhabitants of the other, or over the lands they occupied; or that the discovery of 
either by the other should give the discoverer rights in the country discovered, which 
annulled the pre-existing rights of its ancient possessors. . . . But power, war, 
conquest, give rights, which, after possession, are conceded by the world; and which 
can never be controverted by those on whom they descend.”). 
52 Id. at 544 (emphasis added). 
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Pursuant to Marshall’s revised views, Indian tribes retained rights of 
ownership and possession after discovery, but held only limited 
disposition rights in light of the discovering nation’s “exclusive right to 
purchase.” Marshall stated in Johnson that the colonial charters contained 
“an actual grant of the soil,”53 but in Worcester he repudiates this notion: 
[The charters] purport, generally, to convey the soil . . . . [But] 
[t]hey were well understood to convey the title which, according to 
the common law of European sovereigns respecting America, they 
might rightfully convey, and no more. This was the exclusive right 
of purchasing such lands as the natives were willing to sell. . . . 
[T]hese grants asserted a title against Europeans only, and were 
considered as blank paper so far as the rights of the natives were 
concerned.54  
As Lindsay Robertson has stated, “Worcester was intended to prove 
Johnson’s undoing” by “overruling that part of the [discovery] doctrine 
assigning fee title to the discovering sovereign.”55 As it turned out, 
however, the Johnson version of Indian title prevailed.56 
D. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States (1955) 
In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, Justice Stanley Reed relied on 
the “great case of Johnson v. McIntosh” to hold that Indian “right of 
occupancy” may be terminated by the United States “without any legally 
enforceable obligation to compensate the Indians.”57 It is not surprising 
that the Court in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians followed the Johnson version of the 
discovery doctrine. Although scholars and advocates of indigenous land 
 
53 Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 603. 
54 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 544–46 (emphasis added). Justice John McLean 
concurred in Worcester, but remained an adherent of the “limited possessor” view of 
Indian title. See id. at 580 (McLean, J., concurring) (“Their right of occupancy has 
never been questioned, but the fee in the soil has been considered in the 
government. This may be called the right to the ultimate domain, but the Indians 
have a present right of possession.”). 
55 ROBERTSON, supra note 10, at 133. See also Berman, supra note 34, at 655 (The 
interpretation of the discovery doctrine set forth in Johnson—that “the European 
discovery of the continent instantly brought into being a fee simple property right in 
the common law sense to all the lands in the western hemisphere”—was “justly 
ridiculed” nine years later by Marshall in Worcester.). 
56 See, e.g., KENT MCNEIL, COMMON LAW ABORIGINAL TITLE 264–65 (1989) (“If we 
ignore Chief Justice Marshall’s dictum in Worcester . . . the Marshall Court position 
seems to be that the Crown, by discovery, acquired seisin for and title to a fee simple 
estate in demesne, subject to an Indian right of occupancy.”). 
57 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955). See also id. at 
284–85 (“[T]he rule derived from Johnson v. McIntosh [is] that the taking by the 
United States of unrecognized Indian title is not compensable under the Fifth 
Amendment.”). By contrast, the taking of “recognized title” is compensable. See id. at 
277–78 (“Where the Congress by treaty or other agreement has declared that 
thereafter Indians were to hold the lands permanently, compensation must be paid 
for subsequent taking.”). 
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rights prefer Worcester, the Supreme Court never accepted Marshall’s 
revised “limited owner” view of Indian title. In 1846, the Court in United 
States v. Rogers stated that Indian tribes “have never been . . . regarded as 
the owners of the territories they respectively occupied.”58 In 1873, the 
Court in United States v. Cook ignored Worcester and announced that the 
Johnson discovery rule “has never been doubted.”59 In fact, the Court 
throughout the nineteenth century repeatedly invoked Johnson instead of 
Worcester.60 Remarkably, the statement in Worcester regarding the limited 
effect of the colonial charters has never been quoted by the Court, and 
the assertion that discovery “could not affect the rights of those already in 
possession” has been quoted only once—in Holden v. Joy, a case that 
otherwise endorsed Johnson discovery rule.61 
The issue finally came to a head in 1955, when the Tee-Hit-Ton 
Indians of Alaska urged the Court to hold that Indian title is a property 
right for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.62 In response, the United 
States argued that Indian title is “merely a usufructuary right or privilege” 
that is comparable to the right “of a mere licensee.”63 The United States 
further contended that Indian title is “a permissive right only” and that 
the title “is in the United States with the Indians having a temporary 
possessory right terminable at will by the United States without 
Constitutional liability.”64 
 
58 United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846). 
59 United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591, 593 (1873). 
60 See, e.g., Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 8 (1899); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 
14–15 (1894); Buttz v. N. Pac. R.R., 119 U.S. 55, 66–67 (1886); Beecher v. Wetherby, 
95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877). 
61 Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 244 (1872). The statement in Worcester 
that discovery “gave the exclusive right to purchase, but did not found that right on a 
denial of the right of the possessor to sell,” has been quoted just twice by the 
Supreme Court: in Holden v. Joy, id., and United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 
U.S. 40, 47 (1946) (a case that was strongly criticized, if not overruled by Tee-Hit-Ton 
Indians, 348 U.S. at 282–84). See also United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 
117 (1938) (citing statements in Worcester concerning Indian land rights, but 
endorsing Johnson’s “limited possessor” conception of native property); Francis v. 
Francis, 203 U.S. 233, 238 (1906) (same). See generally WATSON, BUYING AMERICA FROM 
THE INDIANS, supra note 10, at ch. 17. 
62 The Tee-Hit-Tons sought compensation pursuant to the Just Compensation 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment for a taking by the United States of timber from lands 
occupied by the Indians. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 276–77. 
63 Brief for the United States, at 27, 31, Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 
U.S. 272 (1955) (No. 43). The government defined a “usufructuary right” as “the 
right or privilege of using and enjoying a thing which belongs to another, without 
impairing the substance—that is, the right to have the profits and use of the property 
but not its disposition or ownership,” id. at 30, and cited several cases describing the 
Indian title as a usufructuary right. See id. at 28–31 (citing E. Band of Cherokee 
Indians v. United States, 117 U.S. 288, 294 (1886) (The Cherokee Trust Funds); Buttz 
v. N. Pac. R.R., 119 U.S. 55, 67 (1886); Marsh v. Brooks, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 223, 232 
(1850); Blair v. Pathkiller’s Lessee, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 407, 412 (1830); Cornet v. 
Winton’s Lessee, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 143, 144 (1826)). 
64 Brief for the United States, supra note 63, at 49. 
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The Supreme Court agreed. Describing the Indian nations as “savage 
tribes,” Justice Reed held that Indian title was “not a property right,” but 
was rather “mere possession not specifically recognized as ownership by 
Congress.”65 Although the decision has been harshly criticized,66 it has not 
been overruled. In Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida 
(Oneida I), the Court in 1974 again acknowledged the “accepted 
doctrine” that “fee title to the lands occupied by Indians” became vested 
in the discovering nation, and that Indian title was “only a right of 
occupancy.”67 Eleven years later, in Oneida II, the Court cited Johnson v. 
McIntosh at length in support of the proposition that—pursuant to the 
doctrine of discovery—the discovering nations held “fee title” to the 
lands inhabited by Indian nations, “subject to the Indians’ right of 
occupancy and use.”68 Most recently, in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian 
Nation of New York, the Court quoted from both Oneida I and Oneida II 
and observed that “[u]nder the ‘doctrine of discovery,’ ‘fee title to the 
lands occupied by Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in 
the sovereign—first the discovering European nation and later the 
original States and the United States.’”69 Nowhere in Tee-Hit-Ton, Oneida I, 
Oneida II, or City of Sherrill does the Court refer to Chief Justice Marshall’s 
 
65 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 279, 289. Indian title was equated with 
“permission from the whites to occupy.” Id. at 279. See also MCNEIL, supra note 56, at 
303 (“In the United States Indian title remained virtually undefined until 1955 when 
the Supreme Court finally concluded that it confers no proprietary interest at all—
that the holders of this ‘title’ are merely permissive occupiers of government-owned 
land.”). 
66 See, e.g., DRAFT GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 40–53 (citing statements 
in Worcester concerning Indian land rights, but endorsing Johnson’s “limited possessor” 
conception of native property); Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 
MINN. L. REV. 31, 87 (1996); Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1, 17–18 (1991); Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal 
Title Reconsidered, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1215 (1980). 
67 Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida (Oneida I), 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974). 
At one point in his decision, Justice White equates “fee title to Indian lands” with the 
right of preemption. Id. at 670 (“It is true that the United States never held fee title to 
the Indian lands in the original States as it did to almost all the rest of the continental 
United States and that fee title to Indian lands in these States, or the pre-emptive right to 
purchase from the Indians, was in the State.” (emphasis added)). In my view, this 
statement is inconsistent with prior pronouncements of the Court, which state that 
discovery “gave title” and the exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of 
occupancy. See infra notes 91–113 and accompanying text. 
68 Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation (Oneida II), 470 U.S. 226, 234 & n.3 
(1985). 
69 City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197, 203 n.1 
(2005) (citations omitted) (quoting Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 234, and Oneida I, 414 U.S. 
at 667). The Court also noted that “[i]n the original 13 States, ‘fee title to Indian 
lands,’ or ‘the pre-emptive right to purchase from the Indians, was in the State.’” Id. 
(quoting Oneida I, 414 U.S. at 670 and citing Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 860 
F.2d 1145, 1159–67 (2d Cir. 1988)). With respect to the statements equating fee title 
with the right of preemption, see infra notes 106–113 and accompanying text. 
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statements in Worcester v. Georgia regarding the doctrine of discovery and 
Indian title. 
III. DISCOVERY “GAVE TITLE” AND THE RIGHT TO EXTINGUISH 
THE INDIAN RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY 
Michael Blumm and Tim Coulter are both forceful and articulate 
proponents of the “limited owner” view of Indian title. Professor Blumm, 
who served as a moderator at the Spring Symposium, has written a law 
review article that makes two interconnected arguments: (1) Indian title 
includes “all ownership rights except the right to transfer alienable title 
to any person other than the discovering government”; and (2) “[a]ll the 
government obtained from discovery was an exclusive right of 
preemption: the right to purchase Indian title.”70 In the same fashion, 
Tim Coulter and the Indian Resource Law Center contend that: 
there is no sound legal authority either in international or domestic 
law that the “doctrine of discovery” as a matter of law diminished the 
ownership rights of the Native owners or that it gave to the United 
States, as successor to the “discovering” nations, any actual 
ownership interest in Indian lands apart from the preemptive right 
to purchase.71 
Both arguments are restatements of the “limited owner” conception of 
Indian title, which is certainly preferable (from the viewpoint of 
indigenous peoples) to the “limited possessor” formulation. However, I 
remain convinced that the Supreme Court, if squarely faced with the 
issue, would hold instead that discovery did diminish the ownership rights 
of the Indian nations, and gave the discovering nation not only the right 
to purchase Indian right of occupancy, but also the “fee title” to the lands 
at issue.72 
 
70 Blumm, supra note 10, at 773. See also id. at 758 (“Discovery gave discoverers 
only an exclusive right to purchase, excluding other European competitors. It 
simultaneously imposed a partial restraint on alienation on the Indian tribes, 
forbidding fee sales to anyone but the discovering sovereign or its successors.” 
(emphasis added)). 
71 DRAFT GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 14. 
72 It is interesting to note that no one appears to argue for the most favorable 
conception of Indian title: that indigenous inhabitants own and possess the lands 
they occupy, and are entirely free to sell or transfer their property rights. This was not 
always so. In 1781, Samuel Wharton of Philadelphia maintained (with self-interest) 
that Indian nations have “an indefeasible right freely to sell, and grant to any person 
whatsoever.” SAMUEL WHARTON, PLAIN FACTS: BEING AN EXAMINATION INTO THE RIGHTS 
OF INDIAN NATIONS 28 (1781). The Indian nations of the Northwest Territory took a 
similar position in 1793, informing American treaty commissioners that “we consider 
ourselves free to make any bargain or cession of lands, whenever & to whomsoever we 
please.” John Graves Simcoe, Message from the Western Indians to the Commissioners 
of the United States (Aug. 13, 1793), in 2 CORRESPONDENCE OF LIEUT. GOVERNOR JOHN 
GRAVES SIMCOE 17, 19 (E.A. Cruikshank ed., 1924) (emphasis added). Three years 
later, future Supreme Court Justice Brockholst Livingston wrote a private legal 
opinion endorsing the unqualified disposition rights of Indians. Legal Opinion 
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A. The Argument for the “Limited Owner” Conception of Indian Title 
Michael Blumm contends that “the discovering nation” not only 
gained the sovereign right to exclude other Europeans, but also obtained 
the “exclusive right to obtain native lands,” which he describes as “the 
equivalent of an exclusive right of preemption” and characterizes as “a 
proprietary right.”73 The government’s right of preemption imposed a 
“partial restraint on the ability of the natives to alienate their lands,” but 
otherwise the natives “retained what they previously had held.”74 The 
property rights of the Indian nations were—as noted by the Supreme 
Court on several occasions—“as sacred and as securely safeguarded as is 
fee simple absolute title.”75 Blumm does acknowledge that Chief Justice 
Marshall stated in Johnson that discovery “gave title” to the discovering 
nation, but contends that it is “hardly clear” what Marshall meant by 
“title.”76 According to Blumm, Indian title and the discoverer’s title are 
both ownership (proprietary) interests: “the discovery doctrine created a 
kind of split estate, leaving the Indians with a present estate that Marshall 
called occupancy title and giving the discoverer a future interest: a right 
of preemption in Indian lands.”77 In particular, Blumm contends that the 
 
Concerning Indian Land Grants from Brokholst Livingston to J. Schieffelin (Sept. 
1796), in 2 JOHN ASKIN PAPERS 60, 61 (Milo M. Quaife ed., 1931) (“I think Congress 
have no right to say, that the Indians shall grant no Lands without their 
permission.”). The Cherokee Nation, in their complaint filed with the Supreme 
Court in 1830, also argued that Indian nations held complete rights of disposition. 
RICHARD PETERS, THE CASE OF THE CHEROKEE NATION AGAINST THE STATE OF GEORGIA 4 
(1831) (“[The principle] that the first European discoverer has the prior and 
exclusive right to purchase these lands from the Indian proprietors . . . [is] a 
principle to which the Indian proprietors have never given their assent, and which 
they deny to be a principle of the natural law of nations, or as in any manner 
obligatory on them.”). Justice Livingston, who died in 1823 shortly after the Supreme 
Court decided Johnson v. McIntosh, never authored a judicial opinion addressing the 
nature and scope of Indian title. See JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF 
A NATION 469 (1996). 
73 Blumm, supra note 10, at 715. 
74 Id. at 715–16. See also David Wilkins, Quit-Claiming the Doctrine of Discovery: A 
Treaty-Based Reappraisal, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 277, 283 (1998) (The discovery 
doctrine “was merely an exclusive preemptive rule that limited the rights of the 
discoverers or their successors and entailed no limitation on the preexisting land title 
of tribes.”). 
75 Blumm, supra note 10, at 716 (quoting United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 
U.S. 111, 117 (1938), and citing Oneida I, 414 U.S. 661, 669 (1974); United States v. 
Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 46 (1946); Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 
Pet.) 711, 746 (1835)). 
76 Id. at 737. In support of this statement, Blumm quotes Marshall’s observation 
in Worcester that the only “title” granted by the colonial charters was “the exclusive 
right of purchasing such lands as the natives were willing to sell.” Id. at 737 n.156 
(quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 545 (1832)). 
77 Id. at 738. In support of this assertion, Blumm quotes Marshall’s statement in 
Johnson that “[t]he absolute ultimate title has been considered as acquired by 
discovery, subject only to the Indian title of occupancy, which title the discoverers 
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discoverer’s “future interest” is a non-possessory executory interest (in fee 
simple), the Indian title is a possessory fee simple subject to an executory 
limitation, and the divesting condition placed on the possessory fee 
simple is the sovereign’s exercise of the right of preemption; to wit, the 
acquisition of the native right.78 Consequently, Blumm argues that 
statements in Johnson and subsequent cases—that the government 
possessed “ultimate title” or “seisin in fee”—are “at odds with the actual 
proprietary interests held by the Indians and the government.”79 But for 
“Chief Justice Marshall’s mischaracterization of the Indian property 
rights,” Indian title “would have been described as a fee simple subject to 
a right of preemption of the government because, functionally, that is 
what it was.”80 
Tim Coulter and the Indian Law Resource Center also believe that 
the “discoverer’s title” is nothing more than the exclusive “preemptive” 
right to purchase Indian lands. The Center, in its Draft General Principles of 
Law Relating to Native Lands and Natural Resources, addresses the discovery 
doctrine and Indian title in the following “General Principles of Law 
Relating to Native Lands and Natural Resources”: 
(1) The legal rights of Indian or Alaska Native nations to the 
lands and resources they own by reason of aboriginal 
ownership, use and occupancy are the full rights of 
 
possessed the exclusive right of acquiring.” Id. at 738 n.164 (quoting Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 592 (1823)). 
78 Id. at 738 (“Federal grantees of Indian title lands received only a future 
interest, which would not become possessory until the federal government exercised 
its right of preemption. Such an interest is commonly known as an executory 
interest.”). Executory interests are usually subject to the common law Rule Against 
Perpetuities, which states that no interest (subject to the Rule) is good unless it must 
vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after the death of some life in being at 
the creation of the interest. If the discovering nation (or its grantee) does in fact hold 
an executory interest, it is apparently exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities, 
because otherwise it would violate the Rule. There is no time limit placed on the 
“vesting event” (the acquisition of the Indian title), and thus the executory interest 
could possibly vest at a point in time that is beyond the perpetuities period. 
79 Id. at 740. See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 592 (“The absolute ultimate title 
has been considered as acquired by discovery, subject only to the Indian title of 
occupancy, which title the discoverers possessed the exclusive right of acquiring. Such 
a right is no more incompatible with a seisin in fee, than a lease for years, and might 
as effectually bar an ejectment.”). See also Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 8 (1899) 
(“[T]he ultimate title in fee in those lands was in the United States; and the Indian 
title could not be conveyed by the Indians to anyone but the United States, without 
the consent of the United States.”); Buttz v. N. Pac. R.R., 119 U.S. 55, 67 (1886) 
(Johnson is “the origin of this doctrine of the ultimate title and dominion in the 
United States.”); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886) (The discovering 
nations and their successors “recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the 
soil . . . . But they asserted an ultimate title in the land itself.”); Doe v. Wilson, 64 U.S. 
(23 How.) 457, 463 (1860) (“The United States held the ultimate title, charged with 
the right of undisturbed occupancy and perpetual possession, in the Indian nation, 
with the exclusive power in the Government of acquiring the right.”). 
80 Blumm, supra note 10, at 774. 
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ownership, management, control, and disposition 
recognized in law without any diminishment or 
discrimination based on the aboriginal origin of these 
rights. 
(2) The doctrine of discovery gave the “discovering” nation 
particular rights under international law as against other 
European or colonizing nations, namely the exclusive right 
to acquire land and resources from the Native or 
indigenous nations. The “doctrine of discovery” gave the 
“discovering” nation no legal right as against the Native 
nations or peoples. 
(3) Legal doctrines such as terra nullius, the doctrine of 
discovery, and other such doctrines are inconsistent with 
the United States Constitution to the extent that they are 
mistakenly applied to diminish or impair the rights that 
Indian and Alaska Native nations hold with respect to their 
lands and resources.81 
According to the Center, “United States law has always conformed and 
continues to conform to Principles One, Two, and Three. . . . The 
doctrine of discovery under United States law merely gave the 
discovering nation a pre-emptive, that is, exclusive, right to purchase 
Indian and Alaska Native lands—it did not give ownership of those 
lands.”82 Although Chief Justice Marshall states in Johnson that “the Indian 
inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants” and “incapable of 
transferring the absolute title to others,”83 Tim Coulter and the Indian 
Law Resource Center contend that “it is clear that in substance he 
recognized and affirmed that this included all the rights of ownership 
except for the right to dispose of the land to any other European 
country.”84 
Not surprisingly, the Center quotes extensively from Worcester v. 
Georgia, particularly the passages in which Marshall disparages the 
discovery doctrine and states that the colonial charters could only convey 
“the exclusive right of purchasing such lands as the Natives were willing 
to sell.”85 The Center also quotes at length from Oneida Indian Nation v. 
New York, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit states that “the concept of fee title in the context of Indian lands 
does not amount to absolute ownership, but rather is used 
 
81 DRAFT GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 10. 
82 Id. at 17. 
83 Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591. 
84 DRAFT GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 21. 
85 Id. at 21–23, 25–26 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 545 
(1832)). The Center cites the very passage in Johnson that states that “discovery gave 
exclusive title to those who made it” as support for its contention that the Indian 
nations retained ownership of their lands, and lost only the right to sell their lands to 
purchasers other than the discovering country. Id. at 23 (quoting Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 
Wheat.) at 574). 
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interchangeably with ‘right of preemption,’ or the preemptive right over 
all others to purchase the Indian title or right of occupancy from the 
inhabitants.”86 
The terms “ultimate title” and “title” could not mean “fee simple 
title,” according to the Center, “because that would have been 
incompatible with the Indian title to the land.”87 Rather, it is contended, 
Chief Justice Marshall “intentionally obscured” the meaning of “title” in 
his opinions to further his “self-interested aim of making [the discovering 
nation’s] contingent future interests in Indian land still held by the 
Indian owners cognizable legal interests in land.”88 The Center does 
acknowledge that the Supreme Court in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United 
States held that unrecognized Indian title is “not a property right but 
amounts to a right of occupancy which the sovereign grants and protects 
against intrusion by third parties.”89 In response, the Center declares that 
“all Native property is entitled to full constitutional protection,” and 
argues that “the Supreme Court’s non-sensical statement that aboriginal 
title lands are not property in the legal sense is wholly inconsistent with 
the uniform body of precedent establishing the very opposite rule.”90 
B. The Argument for the “Limited Possessor” Conception of Indian Title 
In my view, proponents of the “limited owner” conception of Indian 
title are setting forth what federal law ought to be as opposed to what the 
current law really is concerning aboriginal lands in the United States. The 
Supreme Court, regrettably, has endorsed the notion that discovery 
conferred title along with the right to extinguish Indian occupancy 
rights. Because Johnson held that discovery “gave title” to the discovering 
nation, it does not follow that the right of preemption should be equated 
with “ownership” in fee simple. Nor should the right of preemption be 
understood as the right to acquire fee simple title. Rather, the right of 
preemption—according to the Supreme Court—is the government’s 
right to extinguish the (noncompensable) native right of occupancy. 
 
86 Id. at 32–33 (quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 691 F.2d 1070, 1075 
(2d Cir. 1982)). The Second Circuit, in support of its statement, cites to the Supreme 
Court’s observation in Oneida I that “in the original States [the] . . . fee title to Indian 
lands in these States, or the pre-emptive right to purchase from the Indians, was in 
the State.” Oneida I, 414 U.S. 661, 670 (1974). See also City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian 
Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 203 n.1 (2005) (quoting the same statement from Oneida I); 
Seneca Nation v. New York, 206 F. Supp. 2d 448, 504 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Once 
aboriginal title is extinguished by the sovereign, the owner of the underlying fee title 
or right of preemption obtains fee simple absolute title to the land.” (citing Oneida 
Indian Nation v. New York, 691 F.2d 1070, 1075 (2d Cir. 1982))). 
87 DRAFT GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 27. 
88 Id. at 28. 
89 Id. at 47 (quoting Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 
(1955)). 
90 Id. at 41, 47. 
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When Chief Justice John Marshall died on July 6, 1835, his 
statements in Worcester regarding Indian title soon passed into desuetude. 
Faced with competing versions of the doctrine of discovery, the Supreme 
Court preferred the “limited possessor” conception of Indian title set 
forth in Johnson.91 In 1846, Chief Justice Taney declared in United States v. 
Rogers that the Indian tribes “have never been . . . regarded as the owners 
of the territories they respectively occupied.”92 Just over a quarter-century 
later, the Court cited Johnson for the proposition that the “fee was in the 
United States, subject only to [the Indian] right of occupancy,” and 
stated that “[t]he authority of that case has never been doubted.”93 Just 
one year after the Lakota, Northern Cheyenne, and Arapaho reasserted 
their independence at the Battle of the Greasy Grass (Little Bighorn), 
the Supreme Court in 1877 reaffirmed the Johnson “limited possessor” 
view of native land rights: 
[T]he right which the Indians held was only that of occupancy. The 
fee was in the United States, subject to that right, and could be 
transferred by them whenever they chose. The grantee, it is true, 
would take only the naked fee, and could not disturb the occupancy 
of the Indians: that occupancy could only be interfered with or 
determined by the United States. . . . The right of the United States 
to dispose of the fee of lands occupied by them has always been 
recognized by this court from the foundation of the government. It 
was so ruled in Johnson v. McIntosh . . . .94 
Other courts have acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court 
has accepted the “limited possessor” view of native land rights. As noted 
by Justice Stanley Mosk of the California Supreme Court, “Indian title is 
primarily a permissive right to occupy certain land but the fee title 
remains with the United States government.”95 In similar fashion, the 
 
91 See, e.g., Marsh v. Brooks, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 223, 232 (1850) (“Indian title 
consisted of the usufruct and right of occupancy and enjoyment . . . .”); Clark v. 
Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195, 201 (1839) (“The ultimate fee (encumbered with the 
Indian right of occupancy) was in the crown previous to the Revolution, and in the 
states of the Union afterwards, and subject to grant.”); United States v. Fernandez, 35 
U.S. (10 Pet.) 303, 304 (1836) (“[E]very European government claimed and 
exercised the right of granting lands, while in the occupation of the Indians.”). In 
Tennessee, future Supreme Court Justice John Catron both praised and followed 
Johnson. See State v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. (8 Yer.) 256, 334–35 (1835); Blair v. 
Pathkiller’s Lessee, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 407, 408 (1830). 
92 United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846). 
93 United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591, 592–93 (1874). 
94 Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877). See also Jones v. Meehan, 175 
U.S. 1, 8 (1899) (“Undoubtedly, the right of the Indian nations or tribes to their 
lands within the United States was a right of possession or occupancy only; the 
ultimate title in fee in those lands was in the United States; and the Indian title could 
not be conveyed by the Indians to anyone but the United States, without the consent 
of the United States.”); Buttz v. N. Pac. R.R., 119 U.S. 55, 66–67 (1886) (citing Beecher 
and Johnson). 
95 In re Wilson, 634 P.2d 363, 374 (Cal. 1981) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing 
Oneida I, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974)). 
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United States Claims Court has observed that Indian title “does not vest 
the titleholder with a fee simple interest in the land” because Tee-Hit-Ton 
held that Indian title “‘is not a property right but amounts to a right of 
occupancy which the sovereign grants and protects against intrusion by 
third parties.’”96 Most significantly, the Supreme Court has not wavered 
from its long-held position, and in 2005 observed in City of Sherrill v. 
Oneida Indian Nation that “[u]nder the ‘doctrine of discovery,’ . . . ‘fee 
title to the lands occupied by Indians when the colonists arrived became 
vested in the sovereign—first the discovering European nation and later 
the original States and the United States.’”97 While it is true that the 
Supreme Court has stated that Indian title is “as sacred and as securely 
safeguarded as is fee simple absolute title,”98 it is also evident that Indian 
title is not fee simple absolute. In United States v. Cook, the Court stated 
that “[t]he right of the Indians to their occupancy is as sacred as that of 
the United States to the fee, but it is only a right of occupancy.”99 
Furthermore, in its infamous Tee-Hit-Ton decision, the Court held that 
Indian title is an occupancy right that is not “property” for purposes of 
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The “fee simple” 
estate is a compensable property right,100 and it therefore follows that 
Indian title is not a “fee” estate (whether absolute or subject to an 
executory limitation).  
The Indian Law Resource Center, in its Draft General Principles of Law 
Relating to Native Lands and Natural Resources, makes the following 
argument: 
If discovery had by law already conferred ownership upon the 
discovering country, there would have been no purpose in 
establishing the right of pre-emption, that is, the pre-emptive right 
to purchase or acquire the Native land. The discovering country 
would not have to purchase the land at all because it would already 
own it.101 
This argument misconceives the reason for the right of preemption: it is 
not a right to acquire “the Native land”; rather it is right to extinguish the 
native occupancy right. As Chief Justice Marshall states in Johnson, the 
 
96 Zuni Indian Tribe v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 670, 671 (Cl. Ct. 1989) (quoting 
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955)). 
97 City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 203 n.1 (2005) (quoting 
Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985); Oneida I, 414 U.S. at 667). 
98 United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 117 (1938). See also Oneida I, 
414 U.S. at 668–69; United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 46 (1946); 
Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835)). 
99 United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. 591, 593 (1874) (emphasis added). 
100 See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 638 n.2 
(1981) (“In the typical condemnation proceeding, the government brings a judicial 
or administrative action against the property owner to ‘take’ the fee simple or an 
interest in his property; the judicial or administrative body enters a decree of 
condemnation and just compensation is awarded.”). 
101 DRAFT GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, at 18. 
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discovering nation holds “a clear title to all the lands within the boundary 
lines described in the treaty, subject only to the Indian right of 
occupancy, and that the exclusive power to extinguish that right, was 
vested in that government which might constitutionally exercise it.”102 
The Supreme Court characterizes Indian title as a right of 
occupancy, and describes the discoverer’s title as the “ultimate fee.”103 
The assignment of the fee to the discovering nation—while based on the 
illegitimate doctrine of discovery—is not “at odds” with the Indian title of 
occupancy.104 It is common to own a non-possessory fee simple absolute, 
subject to a possessory interest. Anglo-American property law utilizes 
“future interest” terminology to describe various ways by which one can 
own land but lack the right of possession. For example, during the 
period of time a tenant holds the right of possession, the landlord’s fee 
simple absolute is no longer possessory, but rather is a nonpossessory 
reversion in fee simple absolute. The landlord can sell his reversion in 
fee simple absolute, pass it at death, or retain it and bring suit against the 
tenant for waste. The landlord owns the property, subject to the tenant’s 
right of possession. In similar fashion, the Supreme Court in Johnson held 
that the discovering nation gained title to lands “yet in possession of the 
natives.”105 
In cases involving aboriginal title in New York, the Supreme Court 
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit have made 
statements that seemingly equate the right of preemption with the fee 
title of discoverer.106 The pre-emptive right is not itself title to land, 
 
102 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 585 (1823) (emphasis added). 
See also id. at 592 (The discoverer’s “absolute ultimate title” is “subject only to the 
Indian title of occupancy, which title the discoverers possessed the exclusive right of 
acquiring.”); 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 242 (1st ed. 1826) 
(“[T]he Indians have only a right of occupancy, and the United States possess the 
legal title subject to that occupancy, and with an absolute and exclusive right to 
extinguish the Indian title of occupancy either by conquest or purchase.” (emphasis 
added)). 
103 See, e.g., Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195, 201 (1839) (“The ultimate fee 
(encumbered with the Indian right of occupancy) was in the crown previous to the 
Revolution, and in the states of the Union afterwards, and subject to grant.”). 
104 See Blumm, supra note 10, at 740 (arguing that the notion that the 
government possesses the “ultimate title” or “seisin in fee” is “at odds” with Indian 
title). 
105 Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574. 
106 See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 203 n.1 (2005) (“In 
the original 13 States, ‘fee title to Indian lands,’ or ‘the pre-emptive right to purchase 
from the Indians, was in the State.’” (quoting Oneida I, 414 U.S. 661, 670 (1974), and 
citing Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1159–67 (2d Cir. 1988)); 
Oneida I, 414 U.S. at 670 (“It is true that the United States never held fee title to the 
Indian lands in the original States as it did to almost all the rest of the continental 
United States and that fee title to Indian lands in these States, or the pre-emptive 
right to purchase from the Indians, was in the State.”); Oneida Indian Nation v. New 
York, 691 F.2d 1070, 1075 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he concept of fee title in the context of 
Indian lands does not amount to absolute ownership, but rather is used 
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however, but rather a right to acquire the Indians’ right of occupancy. As 
Justice William Johnson noted in his dissent in Fletcher v. Peck, if the 
government’s interest is “nothing more than a pre-emptive right, how 
could that be called a fee-simple[?]”107 In Seneca Nation v. New York, the 
United States District Court for the Western District of New York held 
that “[o]nce aboriginal title is extinguished by the sovereign, the owner 
of the underlying fee title or right of preemption obtains fee simple 
absolute title to the land.”108 The sentence is worth another look: the 
court states that the owner of “the underlying fee title” obtains “fee 
simple absolute title” when aboriginal title is extinguished! It is difficult 
to comprehend how the existing owner of the fee simple can 
subsequently obtain the fee simple. On the other hand, when a 
possessory right ends, the existing nonpossessory (underlying?) fee 
simple will become a possessory “unencumbered” fee simple.109 As noted 
by the Supreme Court in Clark v. Smith: 
The ultimate fee (encumbered with the Indian right of occupancy) 
was in the crown previous to the Revolution, and in the states of the 
Union afterwards, and subject to grant. This right of occupancy was 
protected by the political power, and respected by the Courts until 
extinguished; when the patentee took the unencumbered fee.110 
As Russell Lawrence Barsh and James Youngblood Henderson once 
queried, “[s]omeone must have fee title, but who?”111 As first-year law 
students are taught, “[a]ll present and future interests must add up to a 
 
interchangeably with ‘right of preemption,’ or the preemptive right over all others to 
purchase the Indian title or right of occupancy from the inhabitants.”) (citing Oneida 
I, 414 U.S. at 670); New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 523 F. Supp. 2d 185, 251 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (Great Britain’s “underlying fee title or right of preemption was good 
against all other discovering nations.”); Seneca Nation v. New York, 206 F. Supp. 2d 
448, 504 (W.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 382 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1178 
(2006) (“Once aboriginal title is extinguished by the sovereign, the owner of the 
underlying fee title or right of preemption obtains fee simple absolute title to the 
land.” (citing Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 691 F.2d at 1075)). See also STUART 
BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND 160–65 (2005). 
107 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 147. This statement is not undercut by the fact that 
Justice Johnson’s view of the case—that the Indian nation held the fee simple and the 
discoverer’s title was nothing more than the right of preemption—was rejected by the 
Supreme Court in Fletcher and again in Johnson. 
108 206 F. Supp. 2d at 504. See also id. at 510 (“Having extinguished Seneca title to 
the Niagara strip and the Niagara Islands in 1764, Great Britain, as the holder of the 
right of preemption, obtained fee simple absolute title to those lands.”). 
109 If Anna conveys Blackacre to Ben for ten years, Ben holds a possessory term 
for years, and Anna holds a nonpossessory reversion in fee simple absolute. When the 
ten years conclude, Ben’s possessory right terminates, and Anna’s “underlying” 
reversion in fee simple becomes a possessory fee simple. Anna did not “obtain” the 
fee simple upon the expiration of the term for years; she owned the fee simple prior 
to, during, and after her conveyance to Ben. 
110 Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195, 201 (1839). 
111 RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN 
TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 38 (1980). 
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fee simple absolute.”112 If the Indian nations, after discovery, held the 
right of occupancy, who held the fee title? The answer—according to the 
European colonizers—is the discovering nation or its successor. Because 
the fee title is vested in the discovering nation, the right of preemption is 
the right to acquire what the discovering nation lacked: the native 
possessory right of occupancy.113 
The discovery doctrine, unfortunately, did diminish the ownership 
rights of the tribal nations. The doctrine, regrettably, gave the 
discovering nation more than a right of preemption: it conferred by fiat 
both title (in the form of a nonpossessory fee simple absolute) and the 
preemptive right to extinguish the Indian right of occupancy. Indian title 
is a “limited possessory” right: possession without ownership, and 
possession without complete power of disposition. 
IV. INDIAN TITLE CANNOT BE ANALOGIZED TO COMMON LAW 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Indian title has been analogized to different common law property 
rights, including a fee simple absolute;114 a fee simple subject to an 
executory limitation;115 a life estate;116 the non-freehold tenancies;117 a 
 
112 BARLOW BURKE & JOSEPH A. SNOE, PROPERTY: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 117 
(2001). See also SANDRA H. JOHNSON ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND 
PROBLEMS 141 (3d ed. 2006) (“[T]he principle of conservation of estates requires that 
all parts of the fee simple absolute, the perfect or most complete estate, be accounted 
for when a lesser estate is transferred.”); Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of 
Sticks: Land as a Community-Based Resource, 32 ENVTL. L. 773, 775 (2002) (“[T]he 
various estates must at all times add up to the whole bundle, a fee simple.”). 
113 THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND 
FUTURE INTERESTS 47 (2d ed. 1984) (“If the owner of an estate in fee simple transfers 
any number of estates in fee tail, for life, or for years, or any combination of such 
estates, the transferor is deemed to have ‘kept’ a future estate in fee simple.”). 
114 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 48 (1831) (“Indians have 
rights of occupancy to their lands as sacred as the fee-simple . . . .”). 
115 Blumm, supra note 10, at 738. 
116 United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591, 594 (1874) (comparing Indian 
title to a tenancy “for life”). 
117 In Johnson, Marshall declared that Indian title “is no more incompatible with a 
seisin in fee, than a lease for years, and might as effectually bar an ejectment.” 21 U.S. 
(8 Wheat.) 543, 592 (1823). Indian title has been analogized to a fixed tenancy, see, 
e.g., ROBERTSON, supra note 10, at 4 (“The indigenous owners were converted into 
tenants on their lands and denied the right to sell their ‘leases’ on the open 
market.”); MCNEIL, supra note 56, at 252 (“[T]he Indians had something akin to 
leasehold possession.”); DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE 31 (1997) (landlord-tenant relationship); a 
tenancy at sufferance, see, e.g., Cornet v. Winton’s Lessee, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 143, 154 
(1826); Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and the Expropriation 
of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1097 (2000); and a tenancy at will, 
see, e.g., 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 895 (1796) (statement by Representative James Holland 
of North Carolina that Indians “were tenants at will”); Inupiat Cmty. v. United States, 
680 F.2d 122, 129 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (“The Inupiats argue . . . that their situation should 
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usufructuary privilege;118 and a revocable license.119 The discoverer’s title, 
in turn, has been characterized, inter alia, as a future interest (a reversion 
or remainder in fee absolute);120 an option;121 and the “naked” fee simple 
 
be analogized to that of a tenant at will who, after his tenancy has been terminated, 
may maintain an action for trespasses committed before termination.”); E. Nathaniel 
Gates, Justice Stillborn: Lies, Lacunae, Incommensurability, and the Judicial Role, 
19 CARDOZO L. REV. 971, 1001 (1997) (noting that the Georgia Legislature 
characterized the Cherokee people, prior to their removal, as mere tenants at will). 
118 E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. United States, 117 U.S. 288, 294 (1886) 
(“Their title was treated by the governments established by England, and the 
governments succeeding them, as merely usufructuary . . . .”); Buttz v. N. Pac. R.R., 
119 U.S. 55, 67 (1886) (“Whilst thus claiming a right to acquire and dispose of the 
soil, the discoverers recognized a right of occupancy or a usufructuary right in the 
natives.”); Marsh v. Brooks, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 223, 232 (1850) (“This Indian title 
consisted of the usufruct and right of occupancy and enjoyment . . . .”); Blair v. 
Pathkiller’s Lessee, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 407, 412 (1830) (“[T]he right of occupancy was 
a usufructuary privilege subject to extinction.”); Cornet, 10 Tenn (2 Yer.) at 144 (“And 
what is this Indian title? It has been called by the courts of this state, a usufructuary 
right . . . .”). 
119 Lac Courte Oreilles Band v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341, 356 (7th Cir. 1983) (“We 
concur with the general proposition that if the Indians’ right of occupancy is 
temporary, their interest in the land is more similar to a ‘revocable license’ than it is 
to ‘title.’”); MCNEIL, supra note 56, at 260 (“In [Justice Reed’s] view [in Tee-Hit-Ton], 
original Indian title which has not been recognized is merely permissive 
occupation.”); John W. Ragsdale, Jr., The United Tribe of Shawnee Indians: The Battle for 
Recognition, 69 UMKC L. REV. 311, 319 (2000) (“Aboriginal title, unrecognized by 
federal treaty or statute, is considered mere possession or license as against the 
dominant sovereign, and is subject to displacement without constitutional 
consequence.”); Note, Indian Title: The Rights of American Natives in Lands They Have 
Occupied Since Time Immemorial, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 655, 655 (1975) (Indian title is 
“essentially a revocable privilege granted by the United States.”); and Brief for the 
United States, supra note 65, at 31 (Indian title “is comparable to that of a mere 
licensee, e.g., a squatter on the public lands.”). 
120 Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 594 (comparing the discoverer’s title to a 
remainder in fee simple); Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 756 (1835) 
(describing the government’s title as “the ultimate reversion in fee”); Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 27 (1831) (“[Indians are not] able to alienate 
without permission of the remainder-man or lord . . . . [And are] without land that 
they can call theirs in the sense of property . . . .”); Catawba Indian Tribe v. South 
Carolina, 865 F.2d 1444, 1448 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[W]here Indian title and fee simple 
title coexist, the fee simple interest operates merely as a reversionary right . . . .”); 
Thomas Jefferson, Conversation with President Washington (Feb. 26, 1793), in 1 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 330, 340 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh 
eds., libr. ed. 1903) (“I consider[] our right of preemption of the Indians lands . . . in 
the nature of a remainder after the extinguishment of a present right . . . .”); Timber 
Unlawfully Cut on Indian Lands, 19 Op. Att’y Gen. 710, 712 (1890) (“[T]he 
respective rights of the United States and the Indians to timber standing on the 
Indian lands are precisely the same as those of a reversioner or remainderman in fee 
and a life tenant . . . .”). 
121 MILLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 5 (“The discoverer acquired an exclusive option 
to purchase tribal lands whenever tribes consented to sell.”); Nell Jessup Newton, 
Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 209 
(1984) (“[T]he early decisions of the Marshall Court viewed the government’s 
property interest in land as a preemptive right to purchase, or a sort of glorified 
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absolute.122 Given the unique nature (and illegitimate basis) of Indian 
title, however, all analogies ultimately fail. 
Indian title refers to “land claimed by a tribe by virtue of its 
possession and exercise of sovereignty rather than by virtue of letters of 
patent or any formal conveyance.”123 Until Indian title is extinguished, “a 
tribe has the collective right to occupy and use its land as it sees fit.”124 As 
previously noted, Indian title is not considered to be “property” subject 
to the Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause.125 The United 
States holds the exclusive right to purchase or otherwise extinguish 
Indian title.126 Until extinguished, the aboriginal title “entitles the tribes 
to full use and enjoyment of the surface and mineral estate, and to 
resources, such as timber, on the land.”127 
The reason Indian title cannot be equated with a common law fee 
title—whether absolute or defeasible—is because the Supreme Court 
squarely held in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians that “Indian occupation of land 
without government recognition of ownership creates no rights against 
taking or extinction by the United States protected by the Fifth 
Amendment or any other principle of law.”128 Life estates and fixed-term 
leases are unlike Indian title not only because they are compensable 
interests when taken by eminent domain,129 but also because they are of 
 
option to buy the land . . . .”). An “option” has been described as “a privilege given by 
the owner of property to another to buy the property at his election.” W. Union Tel. 
Co. v. Brown, 253 U.S. 101, 110 (1920). 
122 Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877) (if the United States grants land 
subject to the native right of occupancy, the grantee “would take only the naked fee, 
and could not disturb the occupancy of the Indians: that occupancy could only be 
interfered with or determined by the United States”); State v. Elliott, 616 A.2d 210, 
220–21 (Vt. 1992) (the “naked fee” is a reversionary interest that becomes possessory 
upon extinguishment of the native right of occupancy); Mary Christina Wood, 
Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions 
Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 109, 138 n.110 (1995) (“[T]he 
United States’ trust title is characterized as ‘naked fee,’ with the full beneficial 
interest vested in the tribes.”); Frederico M. Cheever, Comment, A New Approach to 
Spanish and Mexican Land Grants and the Public Trust Doctrine: Defining the Property 
Interest Protected by the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1364, 1367 (1986) 
(defining the “naked fee” as “title to land without the rights that title customarily 
encompasses”). 
123 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 24, § 15.04[2], at 969. 
124 Id. at 970. See also Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) 
(Tribes have a “legal as well as just claim to retain possession.”). 
125 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955). 
126 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 24, § 15.06[1], at 998. 
127 United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 642 (9th Cir. 1986). 
128 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 285. 
129 See, e.g., Bajwa v. Sunoco, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 454, 460 (E.D. Va. 2004) 
(“[L]essees of [condemned] property are entitled to compensation for the value of 
their leasehold interest.”); Larrabee v. Town of Knox, 744 A.2d 544, 546 (Me. 2000) 
(“The holder of a life estate . . . is entitled to compensation when the property is 
taken for public use.”); State v. Tedesco, 286 P.2d 785, 789 (Utah 1955) (in an 
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finite duration. A tenancy at sufferance is not a compensable property 
right,130 but is still not analogous to Indian title because it arises “where 
the tenant wrongfully holds over after the expiration of his term.”131 
The common law property rights most analogous to Indian title are 
the tenancy at will and the license. Both protect occupancy and use 
rights, both are revocable, and neither is compensable as a general 
rule.132 The difference between a tenancy at will and a license is that the 
former creates an estate (however ephemeral) in the tenant, whereas the 
latter confers no title or interest in the land.133 Because a license is 
focused more on use than occupancy, and is often non-exclusive, Indian 
title is perhaps most akin to the tenancy at will, which typically gives the 
tenant the right of exclusive possession.134 However, Indian title allows 
full use of surface and mineral resources, whereas such consumptive uses 
 
eminent domain proceeding, compensation is due to “vested interests such as 
leaseholds having a fair rental value, life estates and the like”). 
130 Whiteco Industries, Inc. v. City of Tucson, 812 P.2d 1075, 1077 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1990) (“[T]he general rule [is] that the interest of a tenant at will or at sufferance 
upon condemned realty is not a compensable property interest.”). 
131 Thompson v. Baxter, 119 N.W. 797, 798 (Minn. 1909). 
132 See, e.g., Acton v. United States, 401 F.2d 896, 899 (9th Cir. 1968) (“A license 
does not constitute property for which the Government is liable upon condemnation, 
and passes to the licensee no estate or interest in the lands.”); Santa Fe Trail 
Neighborhood Redev. Corp. v. W.F. Coen & Co., 154 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2005) (licensee does not possess an interest in property for which he must be 
compensated in condemnation); Okla. Transp. Auth. v. Tulsa Kampground, Inc., 57 
P.3d 141, 143 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002) (“[A] tenant at will, occupying the property with 
the consent of the land owner, but without a lease, ordinarily has no right to a share 
of the owner’s condemnation award.”); 2 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT 
DOMAIN § 5.03[6][g] (3d ed. 2011) (“A license is permission to use property of 
another for a specific purpose. A license is generally revocable at will . . . . A mere 
license is not generally considered a compensable interest in land or eminent 
domain.”); id. at § 5.02[6][i] (“Tenants at will generally have no compensable 
interest if their property interest is taken by eminent domain.”). 
133 Seven Lakes Dev. Co. v. Maxson, 144 P.3d 1239, 1245 (Wyo. 2006) (“A license 
does not give any interest in the land, but means that one who possesses a license is 
not a trespasser.”); Bernet v. Rogers, 519 N.W.2d 808, 810–11 (Iowa 1994) (“A 
licensee has—with the permission of the owner—the right to use the property. . . . 
[But] has no interest in the property.”); Bishop v. Stewart, 106 So. 2d 899, 900 (Miss. 
1958) (“[A] license confers no title or interest in the land.”); Covina Manor, Inc. v. 
Hatch, 284 P.2d 580, 582–83 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1955) (“A license is an 
authority to do a particular act or series of acts upon the land of another, and conveys 
no estate in the land, whereas a tenancy at will is the permissive right to occupy and 
enjoy premises, and creates an estate in the tenant.”). 
134 Joseph M. Dodge, Are Gift Demand Loans of Tangible Property Subject to the Gift 
Tax?, 30 VA. TAX REV. 181, 255 (2010) (“The legal distinction between at-will 
tenancies and licenses is that a leasehold as a non-freehold estate gives the grantee 
the right of exclusive possession, whereas a license is only a permission for a certain 
use.”). 
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would likely be deemed actionable waste if undertaken by a tenant at 
will.135 
Kent McNeil, who has written extensively on aboriginal title, 
concludes that the Indian title concocted by the United States Supreme 
Court is “not identical to any real property right known to English law.”136 
Justice Joseph Story, who sided with Chief Justice Marshall in both 
Johnson v. McIntosh and Worcester v. Georgia, observed in his influential 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States that the native 
right, “whatever it was, of occupation or use, stood upon original 
principles deducible from the law of nature.”137 The New York Supreme 
Court (of Suffolk County) reached the same conclusion in 1910: 
The relative rights of Indians and the sovereign states that assert 
and maintain ownership of the soil by discovery, conquest, or grant 
are not to be defined in terms of feudal tenures. There is no feudal 
estate which furnishes analogies to the Indian rights. These rights are neither 
easements in gross, tenancies, nor licenses. They are simply Indian rights of 
occupancy.138 
A precise definition of Indian title remains elusive, in large part because 
it is based on the suspect doctrine of discovery.139 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English 
Colonies, Robert Miller on four occasions describes pronouncements in 
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States as “false” statements.140 I agree with 
Professor Miller (and the other symposium participants) that the 
doctrine of discovery should be repudiated. But the doctrine has not yet 
been rejected by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the holding of Tee-
Hit-Ton is not a falsity, but remains “good law” in the same way that the 
 
135 As noted in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 n.12 
(1980), the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century held that “tribal members 
had no right to sell timber on reservation land unless the sale was related to the 
improvement of the land.” This position, however, was “overturned by Congress” and 
“repudiated” by the Supreme Court. Id. The current view is that “the Indians are 
beneficial owners of the land and the timber standing upon it and of the proceeds of 
their sale, subject to the plenary power of control by the United States, to be 
exercised for the benefit and protection of the Indians.” United States v. Algoma 
Lumber Co., 305 U.S. 415, 420 (1939). 
136 MCNEIL, supra note 56, at 265. 
137 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 5 
(1833) (emphasis added). 
138 Pharaoh v. Benson, 126 N.Y.S. 1035, 1038 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1910) (emphasis 
added). 
139 See MCNEIL, supra note 56, at 236–37 (The Marshall Court created “an Indian 
interest unknown to the common law, the definition of which has understandably 
eluded judges ever since.”). 
140 MILLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 59–60. 
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“separate but equal” holding of Plessy v. Ferguson141 was “good law” until 
overturned by Brown v. Board of Education.142  
The Plessy–Brown saga can serve as a guidepost. John Dieffenbacher-
Krall, the executive director of the Maine Indian Tribal State 
Commission, advocates “an all out effort to overturn Johnson v. McIntosh 
just as the NAACP legal defense fund and many civil rights activists 
worked strategically to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson.”143 As David Wilkins 
and Tsianina Lomawaima have noted, the American discovery doctrine 
“is a clear legal fiction that needs to be explicitly stricken from the 
federal government’s political and legal vocabulary.”144 If the doctrine of 
discovery is seen as only conferring the right of preemption, it will be 
easier for the United States to defend the doctrine in domestic and 
international arenas. By acknowledging that the Supreme Court has in 
fact endorsed the more extreme “limited possessor” version of the 
discovery doctrine, advocates for the rights of indigenous peoples will be 
better positioned to expose the injustices of the doctrine and secure its 
repudiation.145 
 
 
141 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
142 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
143 Episcopal Church Repudiates Doctrine of Discovery, Calls on US to Do Same, 
THE PROGRESSIVE CHRISTIAN GUIDE TO PUB. POL’Y (July 29, 2009), 
http://weiwentg.blogspot.com/2009/07/episcopal-church-repudiates-doctrine-of.html. 
144 DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN 
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 63 (2001). 
145 As Michael Blumm has noted, Indian title is in many ways functionally 
equivalent to a common law fee simple title (with limited disposition rights). Blumm, 
supra note 10, at 774. See also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 
24, § 15.09[1][d], at 1025 (“Most tribal property has been recognized by treaty or 
statute, and the availability of equitable and legal remedies for breach of trust, not 
well-developed at the time Tee-Hit-Ton was decided, provides ample protection for 
most tribal land.”). Consequently, there is little downside to recognizing that the 
Supreme Court currently endorses the position that Indian nations do not own their 
lands in fee simple. 
